

# Decision of the FIFA Disciplinary Committee

passed on 1 August 2025

## DECISION BY:

**Jorge Palacio (Colombia), Deputy Chairperson**  
**Thomas Hollerer (Austria), member**  
**Alejandro Piera (Paraguay), member**

## ON THE CASE OF:

**The Israel Football Association**  
(Decision FDD-19845)

## REGARDING:

**Article 13 – Offensive behaviour and violation of the principles of fair play**

**Art. 15 – Discrimination**

## I. FACTS

1. The following summary of the facts does not purport to include every single contention put forth by the actors at these proceedings. However, the Disciplinary Committee (the **Committee**) has thoroughly considered in its discussion and deliberations any and all evidence and arguments submitted, even if no specific or detailed reference has been made to those arguments in the following outline of its position and in the ensuing discussion on the merits.

### A. Background of the case

2. In the context of the 74th FIFA Congress held in Bangkok, Thailand on 17 May 2024, the Palestinian Football Association (**PFA**) presented a proposal (the **Proposal**) in line with article 28.1 of the FIFA Statutes. Said Proposal called for the following measures:

*"1. Adopt appropriate sanctions, with immediate effect, against Israeli teams, including national representative teams and club teams, due to the international law violations committed by the Israeli occupation in Palestine, in particular Gaza.*

*2. Address without further delay the IFA (Israel Football Association)'s violations of the FIFA Statutes manifest in its continued inclusion of football teams located on the territory of another association (Palestine) in its national league.*

*3. Address the repeated failure of the IFA in taking decisive action against discrimination and racism in the areas under its jurisdiction."*

3. Subsequently, the FIFA Council commissioned an independent legal analysis (the **Independent Legal Analysis**) and reviewed the positions of both the PFA and the Israel Football Association (the **IFA** or the **Respondent**).
4. The Independent Legal Analysis reached the following conclusions:
  - The FIFA Council's decision on 27 October 2017 to "declare the matter closed and not subject to any further discussion until the legal and/or de facto framework has changed" does not preclude any FIFA body, including the FIFA Council itself, from acting on the Proposal.
  - FIFA, as a private association, is not subject to international public law. Furthermore, FIFA bodies do not have the authority to impose sanctions for alleged violations of international law.
  - At the discretion of the FIFA Council and given FIFA's zero-tolerance policy on discriminatory conduct, it is recommended that the FIFA Disciplinary Committee initiate an investigation into the discrimination allegations raised by the PFA.
  - Also, at the discretion of the FIFA Council, it is recommended that the FIFA Governance, Audit, and Compliance Committee investigate and advise the FIFA Council on the alleged participation of Israeli football teams based in the territory of Palestine.

5. On 3 October 2024, the FIFA Council decided to adopt the recommendations of the Independent Legal Analysis, specifically endorsing the initiation of an investigation by the FIFA Disciplinary Committee into the discrimination allegations raised by the PFA. Following the above, the FIFA general secretariat informed the then Chairperson of the FIFA Disciplinary Committee, Mr. Jorge Ivan Palacio, of the FIFA Council's decision.
6. On 30 January 2025, Mr Palacio wrote to the Respondent via the FIFA Legal Portal and informed it that an investigation had been opened against it on the grounds of art. 55.1.f of the FIFA Disciplinary Code, ed. 2023 (**FDC 2023**).
7. On 4 April 2025, the Secretariat to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee (the **Secretariat**) wrote to the Respondent and informed it as follows:

*"Dear Madam, Dear Sir,*

*We refer to the above-mentioned matter as well as to the investigations conducted by Secretariat of the Disciplinary Committee as communicated to the Israel Football Association on 30 January 2025.*

*In this context and following the above mentioned investigation, please find all the relevant information and documents, i.e. FARE Report, conforming the case file are available in these proceedings in the FIFA Legal Portal.*

*Special attention is given to allegations 2, 4 and 6 of the FARE Report which can be summarised as follows:*

- *Allegation 2: That the IFA has "repeatedly failed in taking decisive action against discrimination and racism, in the areas under its jurisdiction", notably against Beitar Jerusalem FC, whose supporters openly display racist behaviours. Also, social media posts by some administrators and clubs in Israeli football, such as the CEO of Israeli Professional Football Leagues (on LinkedIn) and FC Maccabi Netanya (on Facebook), indicate "strong support for genocide in Gaza".*
- *Allegation 4: That the IFA has allowed Beitar Jerusalem FC, an Israeli Premier League team from Jerusalem, to operate without issues, even if is known for its racist reputation, with fans openly declaring it "the most racist team" in Israel and hurling epithets at Arab players. Despite Arabs making up 21% of Israel's population, Beitar Jerusalem has allegedly never fielded an Arab player, adhering to fans' claim of being "forever pure."*
- *Allegation 6: That Over 300 Palestinian athletes, including 209 footballers, have been killed by the IDF, and many more are prevented from training or traveling due to restrictions, including the Gaza blockade. Meanwhile, Israeli soldiers and reservists regularly compete in international sports events.*

*In view of the foregoing and in the context of the present disciplinary proceedings, we inform you that the Israel Football Association (the Respondent) has been charged for the potential breach of the following provision(s):*

*Article 15 FIFA Disciplinary Code - Discrimination*

*Article 13 FIFA Disciplinary Code - Offensive behaviour and violations of the principles of fair play*

*In this respect, the Respondent is invited to provide the secretariat of the FIFA Disciplinary Committee with its preliminary position, within ten days of the notification of this communication at the latest.*

*Should the Respondent wish to be represented, we kindly ask it to upload the respective Power of Attorney in the Legal Portal, indicating the corresponding registration (email address) which the legal representative would like to use as login credentials. Please be informed that, in accordance with the Terms of Service and User Manual of the Legal Portal, only one legal representative of each party can be entered in the system, and such entry is using the corresponding e-mail address that that legal representative has used to register to the Legal Portal.*

*We thank you for taking note of the above."*

8. On 11 April 2025, the Respondent submitted a deadline extension request to the Secretariat, which was granted. Accordingly, the Respondent's deadline to provide its position was extended until 14 May 2025.
9. On 1 May 2025, the Respondent, via its legal counsel, submitted as follows:
  - The IFA raised concerns about the completeness and accessibility of the FARE Report, since many referenced documents included therein are either in Hebrew (not an official FIFA language), inaccessible due to broken links, or behind paywalls.
  - The IFA requested a complete and translated file, including missing documents and communications between FIFA and the FARE network.
  - Additionally, the IFA asked for the minutes of the FIFA Council meeting on 3 October 2024 and any draft versions of the FARE Report.
10. On 12 May 2025, the Secretariat wrote to the Respondent and stated as follows:

*"Dear Madam, Dear Sir,*

*We refer to the above-mentioned matter as well as to the latest correspondence of the Israel Football Association (IFA), which has deserved our best attention.*

*In this respect, please be informed as follows on behalf of the Chairperson of the FIFA Disciplinary Committee:*

*a. You will find in the FIFA Legal Portal copies of the documentation referred to in footnotes 17, 30, 31, 32, 36, 37, 39, 42, 48, 50 to 57, 70, 71, 72, 73, 82, 85 and 92 with the corresponding translations.*

b. The documentation mentioned in footnotes 15, 411, 44, 45 and 46 refers to the website [www.football.org.il](http://www.football.org.il), which is the IFA official website. We accordingly deem that the IFA has full access to said documentation. Please advise should this not be the case.

c. As explained in our letter of 30 January 2025, the FIFA Council decided on 3 October 2024 to accept the recommendation of the independent expert report and adopted the recommendation to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the IFA. Accordingly, in that the IFA is already in possession of said report, the minutes of the FIFA Council meeting are irrelevant in this respect. For the sake of completeness however, you will find in the FIFA Legal Portal a redacted version of the minutes in question for your perusal.

d. In respect of the FARE Report as well as the exchange of correspondence with FIFA, we note that said report has been commissioned in line with art. 35 para. 6 lit. b) of the FIFA Disciplinary Code. Therefore, the IFA's request in this respect is rejected.

*In light of the above, the IFA is granted with a final deadline until 2 June 2025 to present its position in these proceedings."*

11. On 9 May 2025, the FIFA Council approved the 2025 edition of the FIFA Disciplinary Code (**FDC 2025**), which entered into force on 1 June 2025.
12. On 2 June 2025, the Respondent presented its position on the matter, as detailed in the relevant chapter below. Together with said submissions, the Respondent filed a cover letter in which it outlined the following:

*"We refer to the captioned proceedings.*

*Within the deadline granted, you will find attached the position of the Israel Football Federation (the "IFA") together with 9 Exhibits.*

*Please note that the IFA respectfully requests the celebration of a hearing before the FIFA Disciplinary Committee in person in Zurich pursuant to art. 53 para. 2 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code (the "FDC").*

*The request is justified by the very particular and unique nature of the matter, which derives from (political and hostile) proposals submitted by another member association, the Palestinian Football Association, to the FIFA Congress. Likewise, the IFA raised important factual and legal arguments, which require that it be allowed to present its argumentation orally. This is even more important in view of the very flawed contents of the undated and unsigned Fare Document. In that respect, the IFA respectfully requests the presence of the drafter(s) of the Fare Document to allow the IFA to examine the drafter(s) and assess inter alio their reliability, knowledge, experience as well as independence and impartiality.*

*That said, the IFA refers to its document production requests of 1, 7 and 12 May 2025. While the Secretariat to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee disclosed some documents, mainly pertaining to the Fare Document, other requests were denied.*

*In particular, the IFA never received the following documentation or information:*

- *The documentation mentioned in footnotes 15, 41, 44, 45 and 46 were not provided as they refer from the IFA official website. While the IFA does have access to its own website, the FIFA Disciplinary Committee does not, considering that the website is not reachable from outside Israel. Furthermore, the contents of the website is only available in Hebrew. Fare should have shared the documentation it relies upon in its own Document with the necessary translation;*
- *The identity and background of the individual(s) responsible for drafting the Report;*
- *The full exchange of communications between FIFA and Fare, including the drafts of the Fare Document that could have been shared prior to the final version;*
- *A detailed report of (i) actions and decisions taken by all member federations when confronted with incidents falling under articles 13 and 15 FDC in their respective national competitions and (ii) any measures that were taken by FIFA, such as these proceedings, against these federations.*

*Against this background, the IFA is compelled to reserve all its rights”.*

13. On 9 June 2025, the Secretariat wrote to the IFA *inter alia* as follows:

*“Dear Madam, Dear Sir,*

*We refer to the above-mentioned matter as well as to the latest correspondence of the Israel Football Association (IFA), which has deserved our best attention. In this respect, please be informed as follows on behalf of the Chairperson of the FIFA Disciplinary Committee:*

*a. While the IFA is entitled to request a hearing in line with art. 53 (2) of the FIFA Disciplinary Code, ed. 2025 (FDC) – as it has done in these proceedings – per art. 53 (1) FDC, as a general rule there are no oral statements, and the FIFA judicial bodies decide based on the file. Accordingly, please be informed on behalf of the chairperson of the Disciplinary Committee that no hearing will be held in these proceedings.*

*b. As stated in our letter dated 12 May 2025, the FARE Report has been commissioned in line with art. 35 para. 6 lit. b) FDC. Therefore, the IFA’s request regarding any communications between FARE and FIFA are immaterial to these proceedings. The IFA may find additional information about FARE in its dedicated website. We outline that the charges brought in these proceedings against the IFA are done so by FIFA, not FARE, and further refer to art. 39 FDC in this respect.*

*c. With regards to IFA’s request for a “detailed report of (i) actions and decisions taken by all member federations when confronted with incidents falling under articles 13 and 15 FDC in their respective national competitions and (ii) any measures that were taken by FIFA, such as these proceedings, against these federations”, please note that FIFA publishes the decisions of its judicial bodies in [legal.fifa.com](http://legal.fifa.com). We further refer you to art. 41(2) FDC in this respect.*

*Lastly, please be informed that the matter will be submitted for consideration and decision by the FIFA Disciplinary Committee in August 2025. The specific date of the meeting will be communicated in due course. Said body shall sit in the following composition (...).*

*Considering all the foregoing, the IFA is invited to submit its final comments, if any, within the next 10 days. Should we not hear from the IFA within the cited deadline, we will deem that it does not want to present any further comments."*

14. On 18 June 2025, the Respondent presented its final comments on the matter, as outlined in the relevant chapter below.
15. On 18 July 2025, the Secretariat informed the Respondent that the matter would be referred for the consideration of the Disciplinary Committee on 1 August 2025, sitting in the following composition:

Jorge PALACIO (Colombia), Deputy Chairperson  
Alejandro José PIERA (Paraguay), Member  
Thomas HOLLERER (Austria), Member

## **B. The FARE Report**

16. The FARE Report, commissioned in line with art. 35 FDC 2023, outlines the following. It is to be noted that since the charge letter issued by the Secretariat on 4 April 2025 identified the allegations listed under no. 2, 4, and 6, the below will mention only what is relevant in this respect.

### **Allegation 2**

17. Allegation 2 is the following, as raised by the PFA: *"that the IFA has 'repeatedly failed in taking decisive action against discrimination and racism, in the areas under its jurisdiction', notably against Beitar Jerusalem FC, whose supporters openly display racist behaviours. Also, social media posts by some administrators and clubs in Israeli football, such as the CEO of Israeli Professional Football Leagues (on LinkedIn) and FC Maccabi Netanya (on Facebook), indicate "strong support for genocide in Gaza".*
18. Accordingly, Allegation 2 concerns the alleged systemic failure of the Respondent to discharge its regulatory and disciplinary obligations against discrimination of any kind. The allegation is twofold: first, that the IFA has persistently failed to take effective and proportionate disciplinary measures against acts of racism and discrimination occurring within its jurisdiction; and second, that certain actors within Israeli football have made public expressions that may be construed as incitement or endorsement of violence, including potential support for acts that could be interpreted as genocidal in nature, without facing any regulatory consequences.
19. The FARE Report substantiates the first part of the allegation by documenting a pattern of discriminatory conduct, particularly by supporters of Beitar Jerusalem FC and Maccabi Tel-Aviv FC, including racist chants, Islamophobic slogans, and xenophobic abuse directed at Arab and Muslim players and communities. These acts have allegedly occurred both in domestic league fixtures and in international competitions. The fan group "La Familia," associated with Beitar Jerusalem, is identified as a repeat offender, with a documented history of racist incitement, including chants such as *"Let the IDF win and f\*\*\* the Arabs"* and *"Here comes the most racist team in the country."* The FARE Report notes that these incidents are not isolated but rather form part of a sustained and pervasive culture of racial hostility.
20. The FARE Report states that the IFA has exercised its disciplinary powers in a manner that is both inconsistent and insufficient. While the IFA has issued fines in a limited number of cases, the sanctions

imposed are described as nominal and lacking deterrent effect. For instance, in the 2022/2023 season, only eight sanctions were issued in response to 190 documented incidents of discriminatory behaviour. This discrepancy suggests a failure to uphold the principle of proportionality and to ensure effective enforcement of Anti-Discrimination norms.

21. The second part of the allegation concerns the conduct of football officials and clubs on social media. The CEO of the Israeli Professional Football Leagues, Mr. Nicolas Lev, publicly shared an article titled "Why Israel Must Fight On," which advocates for the continuation of military operations in Gaza despite acknowledging significant civilian casualties. Additionally, Maccabi Netanya FC disseminated imagery glorifying military hardware and personnel, accompanied by slogans such as "Together we will win." While these posts do not explicitly advocate for genocide, the FARE Report argues that they exhibit unqualified support for military actions that have resulted in mass civilian harm, and that the absence of any mitigating language or acknowledgment of humanitarian concerns may be construed as tacit endorsement of such outcomes.
22. Furthermore, the FARE Report highlights the case of Israeli national team player Shon Weissman, who was investigated by Spanish authorities for potential hate speech after posting inflammatory content calling for the destruction of Gaza. Despite the seriousness of these statements, the IFA did not initiate any disciplinary proceedings against the player, raising concerns about selective enforcement and the failure to uphold standards of conduct applicable to national representatives.
23. In conclusion, the FARE Report asserts that the IFA's regulatory inaction in the face of widespread and egregious discriminatory conduct constitutes a dereliction of its obligations under FIFA's disciplinary framework. The failure to impose meaningful sanctions, coupled with the tolerance of inflammatory public statements by football officials and players, undermines the integrity of the sport and may amount to institutional complicity in discriminatory practices. The FARE Report calls into question the IFA's commitment to the principles of equality, dignity, and non-discrimination.

#### **Allegation 4**

24. Allegation 4 is the following, as raised by the PFA: *"That the IFA has allowed Beitar Jerusalem FC, an Israeli Premier League team from Jerusalem, to operate without issues, even if is known for its racist reputation, with fans openly declaring it 'the most racist team' in Israel and hurling epithets at Arab players. Despite Arabs making up 21% of Israel's population, Beitar Jerusalem has allegedly never fielded an Arab player, adhering to fans' claim of being "forever pure."*
25. Allegation 4, as examined in the FARE Report, concerns the Respondent's alleged tolerance of systemic racism within one of its most prominent member clubs, Beitar Jerusalem FC. The allegation asserts that the IFA has permitted the club to operate without meaningful regulatory intervention, despite its well-documented and persistent association with racist conduct, particularly anti-Arab and Islamophobic sentiment, thereby potentially breaching its obligations under FIFA's statutes and disciplinary code.
26. The evidentiary basis for this allegation is extensive and longstanding. Beitar Jerusalem FC is characterized in the report as having a notorious reputation for racism, primarily due to the conduct of its supporters, notably the far-right ultra group known as "La Familia." This group has been repeatedly implicated in acts of racial incitement, including chants such as "I hate all Arabs" and "Beitar forever pure," the latter being a slogan historically used to oppose the inclusion of Arab or Muslim players in the team. These chants are not isolated incidents but form part of a broader pattern of discriminatory

behavior that has persisted over many seasons and has been widely reported in both domestic and international media.

27. The FARE Report further notes that, despite Arabs constituting approximately 21% of Israel's population—and 39% of the population of Jerusalem, where the club is based—Beitar Jerusalem has never fielded an Arab player in its senior team. This *de facto* exclusion is not formally codified but is widely understood to be the result of pressure from the club's fan base, particularly La Familia, which has violently opposed the inclusion of Muslim players. The most prominent example cited is the 2013 signing of two Chechen Muslim players, Zaur Sadayev and Dzhabrail Kadiyev, which provoked a campaign of racist abuse, including the firebombing of the club's offices. Both players departed the club shortly thereafter. This incident, among others, has been the subject of investigative journalism, documentary film, and academic scrutiny, reinforcing the perception of institutionalized racism within the club.
28. While the club's ownership has, at times, made public declarations of zero tolerance for racism—including a 2019 statement by then-owner Moshe Hogeg—these gestures have not translated into substantive change. The club has continued to refrain from fielding Arab players, and the fan culture remains largely unaltered.
29. The FARE Report further notes that as the governing body responsible for enforcing anti-discrimination framework within its jurisdiction, the IFA is obligated to take proactive and effective measures to sanction and reform clubs that engage in or tolerate racist conduct. The report acknowledges that the IFA has, on occasion, issued fines or disciplinary warnings to Beitar Jerusalem for specific incidents. However, these measures are characterized as sporadic, insufficient, and lacking in deterrent effect. The IFA has not imposed any structural sanctions—such as points deductions, stadium bans, or suspension of licenses—that might compel the club to address the root causes of its discriminatory culture.
30. Moreover, the IFA's continued recognition and licensing of Beitar Jerusalem, despite its persistent failure to integrate Arab players and its association with racist fan behavior, may be construed as tacit endorsement or at least acquiescence, which raises questions regarding the IFA's compliance with its obligations under FIFA's statutes, particularly those relating to the promotion of diversity, inclusion, and the eradication of racism in football.
31. In legal terms, the IFA's conduct may amount to a breach of its duty of care as a regulatory authority, as well as a failure to uphold the principles of equality and non-discrimination enshrined in international sporting law. The pattern of inaction or inadequate response could be interpreted as institutional complicity, thereby undermining the credibility of the IFA's governance and its adherence to FIFA's disciplinary framework.

### **Allegation 6**

32. Allegation 6 is the following, as raised by the PFA: *"That Over 300 Palestinian athletes, including 209 footballers, have been killed by the IDF, and many more are prevented from training or traveling due to restrictions, including the Gaza blockade. Meanwhile, Israeli soldiers and reservists regularly compete in international sports events."*
33. Allegation 6, as articulated in the FARE Report, concerns the grave and disproportionate impact of the Israeli military occupation and hostilities on Palestinian athletes, particularly footballers, and the

contrasting permissiveness afforded to Israeli military personnel in international sport. The allegation is bifurcated into two principal claims: first, that over 300 Palestinian athletes, including at least 209 footballers, have been killed by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and that many more are systematically impeded from training or competing due to movement restrictions, including the blockade of Gaza; and second, that Israeli soldiers and reservists continue to participate in international sporting events without restriction or scrutiny.

34. The FARE Report substantiates the first claim with reference to data published by the PFA, which as of January 2025, reports that 724 Palestinian athletes have been killed by the IDF, including 382 footballers. The FARE Report states that these figures are corroborated by independent media sources, including the Associated Press, and are presented as part of a broader pattern of systemic violence and obstruction. The report further notes that the PFA maintains a public record of these casualties, underscoring the institutional awareness and documentation of these violations.
35. The FARE Report also highlights the structural impediments faced by Palestinian athletes, particularly those residing in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. These include the destruction of sports infrastructure, the denial of travel permits, and the imposition of curfews and checkpoints, all of which constitute a *de facto* regime of movement restriction that severely curtails the right to participate in sport. These restrictions are not merely incidental but are described as part of a broader apparatus of occupation and control, which has been condemned by international legal bodies such as the International Court of Justice and the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
36. In stark contrast, the FARE Report documents the regular and celebrated participation of Israeli soldiers and reservists in international sporting competitions. This includes formal recognition and promotion by the IDF itself, which frames such participation as a source of national pride and resilience. The juxtaposition of these two realities—systematic exclusion and lethal targeting of Palestinian athletes on one hand, and the unimpeded international representation of Israeli military personnel on the other—raises concerns under the principles of equality, non-discrimination, and the right to sport as enshrined in international human rights law and FIFA's own statutes.

## II. RESPONDENT'S POSITION

37. The position of the Respondent can be summarized as follows:

### **As to the jurisdiction**

38. The Respondent started by presenting a jurisdictional objection to the proceedings, asserting that the Committee lacks both subject-matter jurisdiction and adjudicative competence under the applicable regulatory framework.
39. The IFA's argument is that the Committee is not empowered to adjudicate matters that fall within the exclusive regulatory and disciplinary competence of national associations. Article 30(2) FDC expressly vests primary jurisdiction in "*confederations, associations and other sports organisations*" to investigate and sanction conduct occurring within their respective jurisdictions. The IFA contends that the alleged incidents—whether involving fan misconduct, social media activity, or club-level behaviour—occurred within the domestic sphere of Israeli football and are thus subject to the IFA's own disciplinary code and procedures.

40. The IFA further invokes Article 30(7) FDC, which provides a limited derogation from this principle, permitting FIFA to assume jurisdiction only where (i) the relevant member association has failed to initiate a formal investigation within 90 days of the matter becoming known to FIFA, or (ii) the member association consents to the transfer of jurisdiction. The IFA asserts that neither condition has been met in the present case. On the contrary, it adduces evidence of numerous disciplinary actions taken under its own code, thereby rebutting any suggestion of inaction.
41. Moreover, the IFA argues that Articles 13 and 15 FDC—under which the charges are brought—do not confer upon the Committee the authority to sanction a member association for alleged omissions in enforcing its own domestic code. These provisions are directed at direct acts of misconduct, not at failures to prosecute third-party actors. To interpret them otherwise would, in the IFA’s view, constitute an impermissible expansion of FIFA’s jurisdictional remit and a violation of the principle of legal certainty.
42. The IFA also raises a temporal jurisdiction objection, invoking Article 10(1)(a) FDC, which imposes a two-year limitation period for prosecuting match-related infringements. It contends that several of the incidents cited in the FARE Report fall outside this statutory window and are therefore time-barred.
43. In addition, the IFA invokes the principle of political neutrality, enshrined in Article 4(2) of the FIFA Statutes, to argue that the Committee is precluded from adjudicating matters that implicate questions of international law, state conduct, or geopolitical disputes. The IFA underscores that FIFA, as a private association under Swiss law, is not a subject of international public law and lacks the competence to adjudicate alleged violations of international humanitarian law or United Nations resolutions. This position, argues the IFA, is supported by the Independent Legal Analysis commissioned by FIFA itself, which affirms that FIFA bodies have no authority to sanction alleged violations of international law and must refrain from engaging in politically charged determinations.
44. Finally, the IFA contends that the parallel proceedings before the FIFA Governance, Audit and Compliance Committee (**GACC**), which is tasked with examining the territorial status of certain clubs, further underscore the inappropriateness of the Committee’s involvement in matters that are inherently political and jurisdictionally complex.

## **As to Allegation 2**

45. On the merits, the IFA submits that the FARE Report is devoid of probative value and replete with vague, unsubstantiated, and in many instances factually inaccurate assertions. Numerous incidents cited by FARE:
  - fall under the jurisdiction of UEFA and are thus *ultra vires* these proceedings;
  - are time-barred under Article 10(1)(a) FDC, having occurred more than two years prior to the initiation of proceedings;
  - lack any evidentiary support, such as match reports, video footage, or witness statements;
  - are demonstrably false, including references to matches that did not occur as alleged.
46. In contrast, the IFA adduces compelling evidence of its robust enforcement record. It has imposed over 60 sanctions for racist or discriminatory conduct in the 2024/25 season alone, including 19 in the top-tier Winner’s League. Beitar Jerusalem FC, the club most frequently cited by FARE, has been sanctioned on multiple occasions, including fines, stadium bans, and point deductions. The IFA’s

disciplinary code has been amended to broaden the definition of racism and to strengthen sanctions, underscoring its institutional commitment to combating discrimination.

47. With respect to the social media posts cited by FARE, the IFA argues that these do not constitute discriminatory conduct under its disciplinary framework. The posts in question—one by Mr. Nicolas Lev sharing a mainstream news article, and another by FC Maccabi Netanya expressing solidarity with Israeli hostages—do not contain any language or imagery that could reasonably be construed as inciting hatred or discrimination. Moreover, the IFA has no jurisdiction over Mr. Shon Weissman, who resides and plays in Spain and is subject to the disciplinary authority of the Spanish Football Association.
48. Finally, the IFA raises concerns regarding procedural fairness and equal treatment. It notes that FIFA has not initiated comparable proceedings against other associations in response to documented incidents of anti-Semitic conduct in European leagues. The IFA requested disclosure of FIFA's enforcement record in similar cases to assess whether it is being subjected to discriminatory treatment, but this request was denied.
49. In light of the foregoing, the IFA submits that Allegation No. 2 is legally untenable, factually unsubstantiated, and procedurally flawed. It requests that the charge be dismissed in its entirety.

#### **As to Allegation 4**

50. The IFA asserts that it has consistently and effectively enforced its disciplinary code against Beitar Jerusalem FC. Between September 2023 and April 2025, the IFA imposed no fewer than ten sanctions against the club, including fines totaling approximately EUR 116,000 and bans on ticket sales for away matches. These sanctions were imposed in accordance with the IFA's Disciplinary Code and demonstrate the association's commitment to combating discriminatory conduct.
51. The IFA further argues that it cannot be held liable for the internal personnel decisions of its affiliated clubs. It has no legal authority to compel any club to hire or field players of a particular ethnicity, religion, or background. Such decisions fall within the scope of contractual autonomy and labour law, and any grievances arising therefrom must be adjudicated by the competent labour or sports tribunals. The IFA notes that no such claims have been brought against Beitar Jerusalem FC.
52. Moreover, the IFA highlights that Beitar Jerusalem's management has taken steps to distance itself from extremist fan groups and to promote inclusivity. For example, a former owner of the club entered into a partnership with a member of the UAE royal family and launched an anti-racism campaign. These efforts, while not dispositive, underscore the evolving nature of the club's governance and its responsiveness to public criticism.
53. The IFA also draws attention to the broader context of inclusivity within Israeli football. Arab players, coaches, and officials are well represented across all levels of the sport, including in the national teams and in the IFA's executive and judicial bodies. Approximately 30% of the IFA's member clubs are from Arab communities, a figure that exceeds the demographic proportion of Arabs in the Israeli population. This empirical data refutes any suggestion of systemic exclusion or institutional discrimination.
54. Finally, the IFA challenges the FARE Report as selective and of a biased nature. It questions whether similar scrutiny has been applied to other associations, including the PFA, where no Jewish players are

known to participate in national competitions. The IFA contends that the FARE Report fails to meet the requisite standard of objectivity and impartiality and should therefore be disregarded in its entirety.

55. In conclusion, the IFA submits that Allegation No. 4 fails to establish any breach of the FDC by the association. Accordingly, the IFA respectfully requests that the charge be dismissed in its entirety.

### **As to Allegation 6**

56. In response to Allegation No. 6, IFA submits that the claim is wholly extraneous to the scope of the present disciplinary proceedings and devoid of any legal or evidentiary foundation under the FDC. The allegation, which asserts that over 300 Palestinian athletes, including 209 footballers, have been killed by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and that many others are prevented from training or travelling due to restrictions, is framed in a manner that seeks to impute responsibility to the IFA for the conduct of a sovereign state engaged in an armed conflict. The IFA categorically rejects this premise.

57. Moreover, the IFA underscores that the FARE Report fails to establish any causal or legal nexus between the alleged deaths of Palestinian athletes and any act or omission by the IFA. The allegation is based on a single article and is unsupported by any verifiable evidence. There is no indication that the individuals referenced were registered footballers, nor is there any substantiation of the circumstances of their deaths. The IFA notes that the FARE Report does not even attempt to demonstrate that the IFA had knowledge of, or any capacity to influence, the events in question.

58. In addition, the IFA highlights the asymmetry and bias in the FARE Report's treatment of the broader context. The document omits any reference to the 7 October 2023 attacks, during which over 1,200 Israeli civilians were killed and hundreds abducted by Hamas, a designated terrorist organisation. The IFA notes that the Israeli football community was directly affected by these events, with players and supporters among the victims. The omission of this context, in the IFA's view, renders the FARE Report not only incomplete but also manifestly partial.

59. The IFA also challenges the assertion that Israeli soldiers and reservists "regularly compete in international sports events" as somehow indicative of discriminatory treatment. The participation of Israeli athletes in international competitions is governed by eligibility criteria and sporting merit, not by military status. The IFA submits that this line of argument is irrelevant and misleading.

### **Request for relief**

60. The IFA filed the following request for relief:

Prayer 1: The FIFA Disciplinary Committee has no jurisdiction.

Prayer 2: In the alternative to Prayer 1, to dismiss all charges.

### **Final comments**

61. On its final comments dated 18 June 2025, the IFA stated as follows.

62. First, the IFA reaffirms its commitment to combating discrimination within its jurisdiction, citing both punitive measures and proactive inclusion efforts. It references past disciplinary actions and initiatives aimed at increasing minority representation in Israeli football. The IFA argues that these efforts demonstrate its compliance with FIFA's Anti-Discrimination standards.

63. Second, the IFA categorically denies all allegations contained in the FARE Report, which forms the basis of the charges. It characterizes the document as biased and lacking credibility, asserting that it was preceded by a politically motivated proposal from the PFA. The IFA expresses confidence that the FIFA Disciplinary Committee will recognize the document's deficiencies and dismiss the charges.
64. Third, the IFA strongly objects to the Committee's decision not to hold a hearing, particularly given the politically sensitive and unprecedented nature of the case. It argues that a hearing is essential to uphold its right to be heard and to allow for oral presentation of its defense. The IFA also emphasizes the importance of cross-examining the anonymous authors of the FARE Report to assess their credibility, expertise, and impartiality. It notes that the Committee's refusal to hold a hearing was made without explanation and insists that such a hearing would not delay the proceedings, which are scheduled for deliberation in August 2025.
65. Fourth, the IFA challenges the procedural transparency of the case. It questions whether FARE was commissioned as an expert or a third party under Article 35(6)(b) FDC and criticizes the Committee's refusal to disclose communications with FARE or the identity and qualifications of the document's authors. The IFA argues that this lack of transparency undermines its ability to mount a full defense.
66. Fifth, the IFA disputes the legal basis for the charges. It notes that no publicly available Committee decision has ever sanctioned a member association for failing to act on a potentially discriminatory incident at the national level. The IFA interprets the absence of such precedents as evidence that the current proceedings are legally unfounded.
67. Sixth, the IFA raises concerns about the evidentiary reliability of the FARE Report. It points out that several footnotes in the document cite sources from the IFA's official website, which is inaccessible outside Israel and available only in Hebrew. The IFA argues that FARE should have provided translated copies of these documents and that its failure to do so reflects a lack of diligence and objectivity. The IFA asserts that FARE did not verify the information with the IFA or consider the applicable regulatory framework.
68. In conclusion, the IFA maintains that it has taken all appropriate and legitimate actions to address discriminatory conduct in accordance with its statutes and international governance standards. It reserves all legal rights and reaffirms its previous submissions and communications in the case.

### **III. CONSIDERATIONS OF THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE**

69. In view of the circumstances of the present case, the Committee decided to first address the procedural aspects of the case, *i.e.* its jurisdiction and the applicable regulatory framework, before proceeding to the merits of the case and determining the possible infringements as well as the possible resulting sanctions. In doing so, the Committee, reiterated that it has considered all the facts, allegations, legal arguments and evidence provided by the Respondent, and in the present decision had only referred to those observations and evidence regarded as necessary to explain its reasoning.

#### **A. Jurisdiction of the FIFA Disciplinary Committee**

70. First of all, the Committee noted that the Respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the Committee to adjudicate on this matter. The Committee underlined in this respect that such challenge presents four main arguments:
- a. First, the IFA asserts a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the alleged incidents occurred entirely within the domestic sphere of Israeli football. Under Article 30(2) of the FDC, such matters would fall within the exclusive regulatory and disciplinary competence of national associations. The IFA contends that it has already exercised this competence through its own disciplinary actions, and therefore, FIFA's intervention is unwarranted.
  - b. Second, the IFA challenges FIFA's adjudicative competence, emphasizing that Article 30(7) FDC permits FIFA to assume jurisdiction only if the national association fails to act within 90 days or consents to the transfer of jurisdiction. The IFA maintains that neither condition is met, as it has actively pursued disciplinary measures under its own code, thereby rebutting any claim of inaction.
  - c. Third, the IFA raises a legal and temporal objection, arguing that the charges brought under Articles 13 and 15 FDC are misapplied. These provisions, it claims, are intended to address direct misconduct—not failures to enforce domestic rules. Furthermore, it invokes Article 10(1)(a) FDC to argue that several incidents are time-barred, having occurred outside the two-year limitation period for match-related offenses.
  - d. Fourth, the IFA invokes the principle of political neutrality, enshrined in Article 4(2) of the FIFA Statutes. It argues that the Disciplinary Committee lacks the mandate to adjudicate matters involving international law, state conduct, or geopolitical disputes. This position is supported by the Independent Legal Analysis. The IFA also points to parallel proceedings before the GACC concerning the territorial status of certain clubs, underscoring the political and jurisdictional complexity of the matter and the inappropriateness of the Disciplinary Committee's involvement.
71. The Committee accordingly proceeded to examine each of the issues raised.
72. As a departure point, the Committee believed the IFA's assertion that it lacks jurisdiction is directly contradicted by Article 56(1) of the FDC, which provides that the Committee is competent to sanction any breach of FIFA regulations not falling under the jurisdiction of another FIFA body. This provision establishes the Committee's residual jurisdiction over all regulatory violations within FIFA's legal framework. Furthermore, the art. 2 of the FDC confirms that it applies not only to FIFA-organized competitions but also to any breach of FIFA's statutory objectives or rules. Therefore, even if there are certain elements under scrutiny that occurred within the domestic sphere of Israeli football, it remains subject to FIFA's disciplinary authority if it implicates FIFA's broader regulatory interests or statutory values.
73. For the sake of completeness, the Committee underlined that on the allegation that FIFA can only assume jurisdiction given art. 30(7) FDC, it is true that FIFA could have used this provision for each of the incidents that IFA has failed to prosecute. Yet, this is not what the case is about. Rather, it concerns the IFA's failure to comply with arts. 13 and 15 FDC. Therefore, art. 30.7 FDC is inapplicable. Along the same lines, the Committee confirms that by enforcing the IFA's duties under art. 15 and 13 FDC, there is no violation of any political neutrality on FIFA's part.

74. In continuation, the Committee outlined that the IFA's claim to exclusive disciplinary authority fails to account for its obligations under Article 14.1 of the FIFA Statutes. Specifically, Article 14.1(a) requires member associations to comply fully with the FIFA Statutes, regulations, directives, and decisions of FIFA bodies. More critically, Article 14.1(d) imposes a duty on member associations to ensure that their own members—including clubs and officials—comply with these same instruments. This obligation is not discretionary; it is a foundational principle of FIFA's pyramidal governance and legal model, and it is further reflected under article 13 of the FDC.
75. Along these lines, football clubs, though not direct members of FIFA, are considered "indirect members" through their affiliation with national associations. Consequently, they are bound by FIFA's legal framework, and member associations are responsible for ensuring their compliance. The IFA's failure to enforce FIFA rules or to take adequate disciplinary measures against its affiliates may itself constitute a breach of its statutory obligations, thereby justifying intervention by the Committee.
76. Accordingly, the Committee finds that the IFA's contention that Articles 13 and 15 of the FDC are misapplied is legally unfounded. Article 13(1) of the FDC imposes a general obligation on associations, clubs, players, and officials to respect the Laws of the Game and to comply with FIFA's statutes, regulations, and decisions. It also mandates adherence to the principles of fair play, loyalty, and integrity. Article 13(2) FDC provides illustrative examples of sanctionable conduct, including violations of decent conduct, offensive language, political demonstrations, and behaviour that brings FIFA or the sport into disrepute. These provisions are not limited to direct acts of misconduct. They encompass systemic failures, omissions, and tolerance of conduct that undermines FIFA's values. Therefore, if the IFA failed to prevent or address behaviour that violates these principles—whether by fans, clubs, or officials—it may be held accountable under Article 13. The Disciplinary Committee is not expanding its jurisdiction; it is fulfilling its mandate to uphold the integrity of the game.
77. The pyramidal structure of football governance, which has become increasingly significant in light of the sport's globalization and commercialization, depends on the effective implementation of FIFA's legal order at all levels. The IFA's alleged failure to act in accordance with this structure not only potentially would undermine FIFA's authority but also threatens the uniform application of its rules.
78. Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is one issue that the Committee notes is correct per the submissions of the IFA: those matters that fall under the jurisdiction of the GACC. As noted in the opening letter issued by the Secretariat, the focus was on the Allegations 2, 4 and 6 since the matters of Allegations 1, 3 and 5 fall under the scope of that body per article 35.12 of the FIFA Governance Regulations.
79. Therefore, the IFA's jurisdictional objection lacks merit. The Committee has clear authority under the FDC and the FIFA Statutes to adjudicate breaches that affect FIFA's regulatory integrity, even when such breaches originate within a domestic context. Member associations are not autonomous in this regard; they are legally bound to enforce FIFA's statutory objectives and rules.
80. Consequently, the Committee confirmed on the basis of art. 2.1 FDC read together with art. 56 FDC, it was competent to evaluate the present case and to impose sanctions in case of corresponding violations.

## **B. Applicable law**

81. In order to duly assess the matter, the Committee firstly began by recalling the content and the scope of the relevant provisions of the 2025 edition of the FDC, which was, in its view, the edition applicable to the present issue. The Committee considered that the merits and the procedural aspects of the present case should be covered by the 2025 edition of the FDC, with due account of the below.
82. The Committee pointed out that the disciplinary offense, i.e. the Respondent's potential discriminatory conduct and its failure to abide by the FIFA Statutes and FIFA's regulations, directives, guidelines, circulars and decisions, and comply with the principles of fair play, loyalty and integrity, was committed at a time when the 2023 edition of the FDC was in force.
83. In these circumstances, art. 4 FDC, however, establishes that the current edition of the FDC (i.e., the 2025 edition) shall apply to conduct whenever it occurred, provided that the relevant conduct contravened the FDC applicable at the time occurred. In such a situation, the Committee cannot impose sanctions exceeding the maximum sanction available under the then applicable code (*principle of lex mitior*).
84. In the present case, the Disciplinary Committee deemed that the parts of the provision relevant to the present dispute – i.e. art. 13 and 15 FDC – are equivalent in the 2023 and 2025 editions of the FDC, except in two matters.
85. First, the 2025 version gives the Committee discretion to impose a fine of up to CHF 5,000,000 in cases of racist abuse; as this is less favourable to the Respondent, it shall not be applicable pursuant to the principle of *lex mitior* under article 4 FDC. The rest of this provision under art. 15(6) is more favourable to the Respondent and can apply.
86. Second, art. 15(2-5) FDC further specify member association obligations regarding discrimination cases, particularly as to racist abuse. Based on the principle of *lex mitior*, the Committee does not consider that it can apply such provisions.
87. In light of the foregoing and following the provision of art. 4(2) FDC (ed. 2025), the Committee established that, with the aforementioned exceptions, both the merits and the procedural aspects of the present case should fall under the 2025 edition of the FDC.
88. Accordingly, with respect to the applicable regulations, the Committee first referred to art. 13 FDC which reads as follows:

### **13. OFFENSIVE BEHAVIOUR AND VIOLATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF FAIR PLAY**

*1. Member associations and clubs, as well as their players, officials and any other member and/or person carrying out a function on their behalf, must respect the Laws of the Game, as well as the FIFA Statutes and FIFA's regulations, directives, guidelines, circulars and decisions, and comply with the principles of fair play, loyalty and integrity.*

*2. For example, anyone who acts in any of the following ways may be subject to disciplinary measures:*

*a) violating the basic rules of decent conduct;*

*b) insulting a natural or legal person in any way, especially by using offensive gestures, signs or language;*

*c) using a sports event for demonstrations of a non-sporting nature;*

- d) *behaving in a way that brings the sport of football and/or FIFA into disrepute;*
- e) *actively altering the age of players shown on the identity cards they produce at competitions that are subject to age limits.*

89. The Committee then referred to art. 15 FDC, as follows:

#### **15. DISCRIMINATION AND RACIST ABUSE**

*1. Any person who offends the dignity or integrity of a country, a person or group of people through contemptuous, discriminatory or derogatory words or actions on account of race, skin colour, ethnicity, nationality, social origin, gender, disability, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or any other opinion, wealth, birth or any other status or any other reason shall be sanctioned with a suspension lasting at least ten matches or a specific period, or any other appropriate disciplinary measure.*

*(...)*

*6. If one or more supporters of a representative team or club engage in the behaviour described in paragraph 1 above, the member association or club responsible will be subject to the following disciplinary measures, even if the member association or club concerned can prove the absence of any fault or negligence: a) For a first offence, playing a match with a limited number of spectators and a fine of at least CHF 20,000 shall be imposed on the association or club concerned, unless this would lead to an unreasonable financial impact on the affected member association or club, in which case the fine may be reduced, on an exceptional basis, to no less than CHF 1,000. (...).*

### **C. Standard of proof**

- 91. Firstly, the Committee recalled that, as a generally rule, the burden of proof regarding disciplinary infringements rests on the FIFA Judicial Bodies (cf. art. 41 FDC). In other words, the Committee is required to prove the relevant infringement(s) at stake. At the same time,
- 92. Secondly, the Committee pointed out that, according to art. 39.3 FDC, the standard of "*comfortable satisfaction*" is applicable in disciplinary proceedings. According to this standard of proof, the onus is on the sanctioning authority to establish the disciplinary violation to the comfortable satisfaction of the judging body, taking into account the seriousness of the allegation.
- 93. Having clarified the foregoing, the Committee proceeded to consider the merits of the case.

### **D. Merits of the case**

#### **1. Issues of review – have Allegations 2, 4 and 6 materialized?**

- 94. The relevant provisions having been recalled, and the above having been established, the Committee proceeded to analyse the evidence at its disposal, in particular the documentation and information provided in the scope of the present disciplinary proceedings, in order to determine the potential violations of the FDC.

95. In this context, the Committee acknowledged the following elements of the FARE Report, as raised by the PFA:

- i. *Allegation 2: that the IFA has "repeatedly failed in taking decisive action against discrimination and racism, in the areas under its jurisdiction", notably against Beitar Jerusalem FC, whose supporters openly display racist behaviours. Also, social media posts by some administrators and clubs in Israeli football, such as the CEO of Israeli Professional Football Leagues (on LinkedIn) and FC Maccabi Netanya (on Facebook), indicate "strong support for genocide in Gaza".*
- ii. *Allegation 4: "That the IFA has allowed Beitar Jerusalem FC, an Israeli Premier League team from Jerusalem, to operate without issues, even if is known for its racist reputation, with fans openly declaring it "the most racist team" in Israel and hurling epithets at Arab players. Despite Arabs making up 21% of Israel's population, Beitar Jerusalem has allegedly never fielded an Arab player, adhering to fans' claim of being "forever pure."*
- iii. *Allegation 6: That Over 300 Palestinian athletes, including 209 footballers, have been killed by the IDF, and many more are prevented from training or traveling due to restrictions, including the Gaza blockade. Meanwhile, Israeli soldiers and reservists regularly compete in international sports events.*

96. The above being recalled, the Committee firstly wishes to point out that the Respondent contests vehemently the allegations, as outlined in the relevant sections above.

97. Having noted the foregoing, the Committee observed that the issues raised in the FARE Report can be divided as follows:

**Allegation 2 – Failure to act against racism and discriminatory behavior:**

1. Inaction regarding racist behavior by Beitar Jerusalem FC supporters.
2. Social media post by the CEO of the Israeli Professional Football Leagues showing support for the war in Gaza, and social media post by FC Maccabi Netanya expressing similar support.

**Allegation 4 – Tolerance of Beitar Jerusalem FC's racist reputation:**

1. Fans openly label the club as "the most racist team" in Israel.
2. Fans direct racist epithets at Arab players.
3. The club has allegedly never fielded an Arab player.
4. The club aligns with fans' claim of being "forever pure."

**Allegation 6 – Disparities in treatment of Palestinian and Israeli athletes:**

1. Over 300 Palestinian athletes, including 209 footballers, have been killed by the IDF.
2. Palestinian athletes face travel and training restrictions due to the Gaza blockade.
3. Israeli soldiers and reservists continue to participate in international sports events.

98. As to the allegation 2.1, the Respondent has presented a list of disciplinary cases, amongst which 3 matches concern Beitar Jerusalem FC, namely:

- Premier League, 15/09/24 20:15, Beitar Jerusalem - Maccabi Netanya, Teddy Stadium (**Match 1**)

- Premier League, 10/28/24 20:00, Beitar Jerusalem - Maccabi Tel Aviv, Teddy Stadium (**Match 2**).
- Premier League, 09/11/24 15:00, Beitar Jerusalem - Hapoel Haifa, Teddy Stadium (**Match 3**).

99. The incidents reported for such matches are as follows (quoted *verbatim* from the evidence presented by the IFA):

Match	Incident	Remark
1	Ball-bringers full arrival, attire, conduct, filling the role properly during the second half of the game the match referee remarked to the bench staff that the ball-bringers were delayed with the return of the balls and were not performing well.	Technical closure
1	Incidents Incidents and disciplinary incidents 1. With the start of the game in the 1st minute of the game, the referee of the game had to stop the game for about 20 seconds in order to clear yellow balloon bags (used for decor in the stands) that flew from the eastern stand where fans of the Jerusalem House were populated to the grass and had to be cleared from the grass. At minute 5 yellow balloon bags had to be cleared again this time without the need to stop the game . They were evacuated during a game break (horn kick) . 2. In the 67th minute of the game, a boy (about 15 years old) burst from the eastern stand where fans of the Jerusalem Beit R. were accommodated into the grass and was immediately removed by the security forces. This case did not cause the game to stop because the boy broke into the grass while the referee blew the goalie's five kick and the game was already in stoppage time. 3. During the second half, the match referee alerted the bench staff that the ball-bringers were not functioning well and were delayed with the return of the balls. And the issue was handled by the host thorn team.	Technical closure
1	Prohibited substances testing room inspection did not take place	
1	Ball-bringers full arrival, attire, conduct, filling the role properly during the second half of the game the match referee commented to the bench staff that the ball-bringers were delayed with the return of the balls and were not performing well.	In general incidents
1	Incidents Incidents and disciplinary incidents 1. When the game started in the first minute, the referee of the game had to stop the game for about 20 seconds in order to clear yellow balloon bags (used for the setting in the stands) that flew to all the grass, from the eastern stand where the fans of the Jerusalem Beit R team were sitting and it was necessary to clear them from the grass. In the fifth minute, yellow balloon bags had to be cleared again, this time without the need to stop the game. The bags were cleared during the stoppage of play (horn kick). 2. In the 67th minute, a boy (about 15 years old) broke out of the eastern stand inhabited by fans of the Beitar Jerusalem team into the grass and was immediately taken out by the security forces. This case did not cause the game to stop because the boy broke into the grass while the referee blew the goalie's five kick and the game stopped for her. 3. During the second half, the match referee alerted the bench staff that the ball-bringers were not functioning well and were delayed with the return of the balls. The matter was addressed by the staff of the host group.	Charges were filed
2	Meeting deadlines, exceeding the scheduled schedules (guest) The Maccabi Tel Aviv team left a minute and a half late compared to the scheduled time from the dressing room and because of this the game started a minute and a half late.	Treated

2	<p>Incidents Incidents and disciplinary incidents 1. The game started a minute and a half late due to the late Maccabi Tel Aviv players arriving in the players' tunnel before going to the grass. 2. In the 34th minute, a fan from the western stand, which was populated by fans of the Jerusalem Beitar team, jumped into the grass, crossed the field (through the field of play) and went up to the eastern stand opposite, where fans of the Jerusalem Beitar team were also sitting. Crossing the fan did not stop the game. 3. In the 47th minute, the referee of the match asked for an announcement to the crowd of the occupants of the South Stand which was populated by fans of the Beitar Jerusalem team to stop throwing objects into the goal square of the goalkeeper of the Maccabi Tel Aviv team. At the end of the game, the referee reported to me that several objects had been thrown from the south stand, so he asked to announce to the crowd, after which the consequences of the objects were stopped. 4. At the end of the game, the referee of the game reported to me that in the 58th minute, a spark plug was thrown into the grass from the direction of the eastern stand, which was inhabited by fans of the Beit R Jerusalem team (I did not see the event). 5. In the 78th minute, a fan (boy) from the south stand, which was populated by fans of the Beitar Jerusalem team, jumped into the grass, took a selfie with the captain of the Beitar Jerusalem team, and went up to the east stand (where fans of the Beitar Jerusalem team were sitting). The fan's entry did not stop the game.</p>	Treated
2	<p>Meeting deadlines Deviating from the scheduled schedules (guest) The Maccabi Tel Aviv team left the scheduled time one and a half minutes late from the dressing room and because of this the game opened one and a half minutes late.</p>	Technical closure
2	<p>Incidents Incidents and disciplinary incidents 1. The game started a minute and a half late due to the delay of a group of Maccabi Tel Aviv players in arriving at the players' tunnel and going up to the grass. 2. In the 34th minute of the game, a fan jumped into the turf from the West Stand where the Beitar Jerusalem fans were accommodated "Crossing the field and going up to the East Stand opposite where the Beitar Jerusalem" fans were also accommodated. Crossing the fan did not stop the game. 3. In minute 47, the match referee asked for a proclamation to the crowd of the occupants of the South Stand which was populated by fans of the Jerusalem "Beitar" to stop throwing objects into the goal square of the Maccabi Tel Aviv goalkeeper. At the end of the game, the referee reported to me that several objects had been thrown from the south stand, so he asked to announce to the crowd and the consequences of the objects were stopped. 4. The match referee reported to me at the end of the match that in minute 58, a spark plug was thrown into the grass from the direction of the eastern stand, which was populated by fans of the Beit R Jerusalem team. 5. In the 78th minute of the game, a fan (boy) from the southern stand, which was populated by fans of the Jerusalem Beitar team, jumped into the grass and took a selfie with the captain of the Beitar Jerusalem team and immediately went up and moved to the eastern stand. This entry of the fan did not stop the game.</p>	Technical closure
3	<p>Lot inspection - rules of problematic heating areas do not exist</p>	
3	<p>Conduct in the arena The Mascott doll is not present</p>	
3	<p>Incidents Incidents and incidents of Discipline 1) In the 2nd minute, a yellow smoke grenade was lit inside the eastern stand, which contained the fans of the home team. 2) In the 95th minute and immediately after the home team's goal was scored, several fans came down from the eastern stand, which contained the home team's fans towards the grass. Fans passed the advertising signs but</p>	Charges were filed

were soon dispersed and returned to the stands.

100. As it can be seen from the above, none of the incidents for Match 1, 2 or 3 concern discrimination.

101. At the same time, the IFA claims to have sanctioned Beitar Jerusalem FC with ILS 355,500 (approx. CHF 80,000), yet it does not identify which are the concerned matches, and it can be noted from the evidence provided that the fines are not exclusively for discriminatory behaviour. By the same token, a total of ILS 1,121,750 (approx. CHF 266,000) is listed in fines rendered by the IFA in general against its clubs, while the same lack of specification is noted. Yet, as observed in the FARE Report:

*“In addition to the list of matches identified by Fare, it is worth noting the information collected and presented through the ‘Kicking racism and violence off the pitches’ programme presently run by Givat Haviva, a Jewish-Arab civil society organisation based in Israel. The programme was initially founded and run by the New Israel Fund<sup>29</sup> ‘with the aim of reducing the phenomena of racism and violence in football through monitoring, reporting and raising awareness of the issue’. Presently, the programme presents a weekly summary<sup>30</sup> of discriminatory incidents witnessed at Israeli Premier League matches. Matan Segal, the programme’s director, wrote in September 2024 that the previous season their organisation registered 224 racist chants occurring at matches between Israeli teams. In the 2022/2023 season, the programme reported 190 discriminatory incident. All except three teams were responsible for at least one discriminatory incident in the 2022/2023 season. Beitar Jerusalem had the highest number of incidents (78), followed by Maccabi Tel-Aviv (65).”*

102. The FARE Report also outlines Beitar Jerusalem FC’s deeply entrenched racism, particularly among its fan bases. The club has long been infamous for its open hostility toward Arabs, despite Arabs making up over a fifth of Israel’s population. Fans have proudly labelled Beitar “the most racist team” in the country, chanting slurs like “terrorist” at Arab players on opposing teams. The club has never fielded an Arab player, a stance fans defend with the slogan “forever pure”.

103. Considering the opposition between the contents of the FARE Report and the explanations given by the Respondent, the Committee was satisfied that the Allegation 2.1 materialized. Even if the Committee was to accept the sanctions imposed – *quod non* – the fact is that the fines imposed are almost irrelevant in light of the seriousness of the matter. Along these lines, the Committee was also satisfied that the Allegation 4 has also materialized, in that it is closely connected to the Allegation 2.1. The Committee further noted that the FARE Report is further substantiated by several other reports, either in the media or other organizations of the civil society, that further corroborate the assessment.

104. Moving on to Allegation 2.2, the Committee noted that the FARE Report outlines a social media post by the CEO of the Israeli Leagues, Mr Nicolas Lev, sharing an article of November 2023 which in essence discusses the war in Gaza. The same goes for the club FC Maccabi Netanya and their social media activity.

105. The Respondent does not deny that the social media posts happened, and they are further corroborated by the case file, in which said activities are depicted. The Committee is therefore satisfied that Allegation 2.2 materialized.

106. In continuation, the FARE Report addresses Allegation 6, and states as follows:

*Allegation 6 is constituted of two main assertions:*

*6.1. Over 300 Palestinian athletes, including 209 footballers, have been killed by the IDF, and many more are prevented from training or traveling due to restrictions, including the Gaza blockade.*

*6.2. Israeli soldiers and reservists regularly compete in international sports events.*

*Both assertions are true - established media outlets such as the Associated Press reported similar number of victims, citing Palestinian authorities<sup>91</sup>. The Palestinian FA includes a section on their official website accounting deaths of football players or staff that are caused by the IDF. The participation of IDF soldiers in sports competitions has also been widely reported and celebrated, including by the IDF<sup>95</sup>. As of January 22, 2025, according to the Palestinian FA, the total number of Palestinian athletes killed by the IDF has grown to 724 people, including 382 footballers.*

*The restrictions faced by Palestinians has been discussed above, see Allegation 5.*

107. The FARE Report further outlines that Palestinians are effectively barred from entering football stadiums located in Israeli settlements in the West Bank. These settlements are in the so called "Area C", which is under full Israeli control and where Palestinians face severe movement restrictions. According to the International Court of Justice and Human Rights Watch:

- Palestinians need special permits to enter settlements, which are rarely granted except for labor purposes.
- Football clubs in these settlements serve only Israelis, excluding Palestinians from participating as players, spectators, or youth participants.
- The Israeli military designates these areas as closed military zones, reinforcing the exclusion.
- Even attempts to include Palestinian children in sports programs have failed due to permit issues and political pressure.

108. The FARE Report concludes that the exclusion of Palestinians from settlement stadiums is a direct result of the broader system of movement restrictions and discriminatory policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

109. The Respondent, for its part, disputes these assertions:

- i. First, it notes that the matter is currently under investigation by GACC which has been tasked with examining the participation of Israeli teams based in disputed territories. The GACC is also authorized to consult experts to interpret the concept of "territory" and the boundaries relevant to the PFA. Therefore, the IFA argues that this issue falls outside the scope of the current disciplinary proceedings and is not within the jurisdiction of FIFA's Disciplinary Committee.
- ii. Second, the IFA asserts that the allegation is based solely on public international law, which it claims is inapplicable to FIFA's internal disciplinary matters. It emphasizes that the territorial status of the West Bank remains unresolved and subject to future negotiations under the Oslo II Accord between Israel and the Palestine Liberation

Organization. As such, the IFA contends that it is not for FIFA or its committees to adjudicate on these complex political and legal disputes.

- iii. Furthermore, the IFA maintains that the clubs in question operate in areas under Israeli jurisdiction, as agreed upon in existing Israeli-Palestinian arrangements. It argues that it has the legitimate authority to organize football activities in these regions and that no discriminatory actions have been identified in relation to this allegation. Since no violation of the FDC has been demonstrated—specifically Articles 13 or 15—the IFA concludes that no sanctions can be imposed.

110. The Committee notes here that whether the issue of playing and organizing football is currently under review by the GACC and did not form part of the case file and the charges brought against the IFA, Allegation 6 concerns specifically the supposed restriction of movement of Palestinians for football-related activities and the allegation of discrimination against these. The Committee further noted the ICH and HRW conclusions referred to in the FARE Report and underlined they are compelling. The Committee is thus satisfied that the Allegation 6 materialized in this respect.

111. The above being determined, the Committee subsequently turned to its analysis of the abovementioned incident(s) in order to assess whether any provisions of the FDC had been breached by the Respondent.

## 2. The Respondent's liability

112. As a preliminary remark, the Committee recalled the following provisions of the FIFA Statutes (emphasis added):

### 2. Objectives

*The objectives of FIFA are:*

**(a) to improve the game of football constantly and promote it globally in the light of its unifying, educational, cultural and humanitarian values, particularly through youth and development programmes;**

(...)

**(e) to use its efforts to ensure that the game of football is available to and resourced for all who wish to participate, regardless of gender or age;**

(...)

### 3. Human rights

*FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall **strive to promote the protection of these rights.***

### 4. Non-discrimination, equality and neutrality

**1. Discrimination of any kind against a country, private person or group of people on account of race, skin colour, ethnic, national or social origin, gender, disability, language, religion, political opinion or any other opinion, wealth, birth or any other status, sexual orientation or any other reason is strictly prohibited and punishable by suspension or expulsion.**

**2. FIFA remains neutral in matters of politics and religion. Exceptions may be made with regard to matters affected by FIFA's statutory objectives.**

*5. Promoting friendly relations*

*1. FIFA shall promote friendly relations:*

- (a) between and among member associations, confederations, clubs, officials and players; and*  
***(b) in society for humanitarian objectives.***

*14. Member associations' obligations*

*1. Member associations have the following obligations:*

- (a) to comply fully with the Statutes, regulations, directives and decisions of FIFA bodies at any time as well as the decisions of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) passed on appeal on the basis of article 49 paragraph 1 of the FIFA Statutes;*  
*(b) to take part in competitions organised by FIFA;*  
*(c) to pay their membership subscriptions;*  
*(d) to cause their own members to comply with the Statutes, regulations, directives and decisions of FIFA bodies;*  
*(e) to convene its supreme and legislative body at regular intervals, at least every two years;*  
*(f) to ratify statutes that are in accordance with the requirements laid down in these Statutes;*  
*(g) to create a referees' committee that is directly subordinate to the member association;*  
*(h) to respect the Laws of the Game;*  
*(i) to manage their affairs independently and ensure that their own affairs are not influenced by any third parties in accordance with article 19 of these Statutes;*  
*(j) to prevent and fight against any kind of discrimination;*  
*(k) to promote the development of women's football and the full participation of women at all levels; and*  
*(l) to comply fully with all other duties arising from these Statutes and other regulations.*

*2. Violation of the above-mentioned obligations by any member association may lead to sanctions provided for in these Statutes.*

*3. Violations of paragraph 1 (i) may also lead to sanctions, even if the third-party influence was not the fault of the member association concerned. Each member association is responsible towards FIFA for any and all acts of the members of their bodies caused by the gross negligence or wilful misconduct of such members.*

113. The Committee equally recalled the contents of articles 13 and 15 FDC, as explained already in these proceedings.

***In general: FIFA's statutory objectives and their intersection with articles 13 and 15 FDC***

114. In this sense, the Committee underlined that FIFA's statutory commitment to promoting peace and respect without discrimination is not merely aspirational, it is foundational to the football's identity and global mission. Football, as the world's most popular sport, transcends borders, languages, and cultures. It is played and loved in every corner of the globe, often in communities facing conflict, inequality, or marginalization. In this context, the Committee recognizes that football is uniquely positioned to serve as a vehicle for unity, dialogue, and social transformation.

115. As stated in Article 2 of the FIFA Statutes, one of FIFA's primary objectives is to *"improve the game of football constantly and promote it globally in the light of its unifying, educational, cultural and humanitarian values"*. The Committee is of the view that these values are not incidental: they are intrinsic to the nature of football itself. On the pitch, players compete under the same rules, guided by

principles of fairness, teamwork, and mutual respect. Off the pitch, football fosters community, identity, and hope. It teaches young people discipline, resilience, and empathy, and it offers a platform for inclusion and empowerment, particularly through youth and development programmes.

116. This objective is further reinforced by FIFA's commitment to human rights (Article 3), which obliges the organization to respect and promote internationally recognized human rights standards. In practice, this means ensuring that football is accessible to all, regardless of race, gender, age, ability, or background. Article 2(e) explicitly mandates that *FIFA "use its efforts to ensure that the game of football is available to and resourced for all who wish to participate"*. This inclusive approach is not only a moral imperative, but also essential to the integrity and sustainability of the sport.
117. Likewise, article 4 of the Statutes provides a clear and uncompromising stance against discrimination of any kind. It prohibits discrimination based on race, skin colour, ethnic, national or social origin, gender, disability, language, religion, political opinion, sexual orientation, or any other status. This provision reflects the understanding that discrimination undermines the very essence of sport, which is built on equality of opportunity and respect for diversity.
118. At this junction the Committee deemed important to underline that while FIFA remains neutral in matters of politics and religion, it reserves the right to engage in issues that intersect with its statutory objectives, such as combating discrimination or promoting human rights and humanitarian objectives.
119. The Committee, in interpreting the cited provisions of the FIFA Statutes, underlines that FIFA's objective to promote peace and respect without discrimination is essential to the spirit of football. By embedding these principles into its governance, competitions, and development programmes, the goal is to ensure that football remains a force for good in the world. It is through this lens that the sport continues to inspire millions, foster unity, and contribute to a more just and peaceful global society.
120. These principles are the ones at stake in this matter. The question that underlines the case at hand is whether the Respondent has fostered said principles, and promoted inclusion, diversity, wellbeing and social integration through football. This is why the Respondent is charged with potential breaches of articles 13 and 15 FDC.
121. Along these lines, the Committee underlined that article 13 of the FDC serves as a cornerstone for upholding the ethical and moral standards that govern football. It establishes a general obligation for all actors within the football ecosystem—associations, clubs, players, officials, and any person acting on their behalf—to adhere not only to the technical rules of the game but also to the broader principles of fair play, loyalty, and integrity. These principles are essential to maintaining the credibility, inclusiveness, and unifying power of football.
122. The first paragraph of Article 13 mandates compliance with the Laws of the Game, the FIFA Statutes, and all associated regulations, directives, guidelines, circulars, and decisions. This reflects FIFA's commitment to a coherent and consistent global governance structure. It ensures that all participants operate within a shared framework that promotes transparency, accountability, and legal certainty. This obligation is both procedural and foundational to the rule of law in sport and to the trust that stakeholders place in FIFA's disciplinary system. It is also in line with the contents of art. 14 and 15 of the FIFA Statutes.
123. It is noteworthy that within the contents of said article the issue of fair play is raised. Fair play, in its essence, is a sporting ideal as well as a moral imperative. It encompasses respect for opponents,

referees, and the spirit of the game. Loyalty refers to the faithful observance of the rules and the values of football, while integrity demands honesty and ethical conduct both on and off the pitch. These principles are directly aligned with FIFA's statutory objectives, particularly those outlined in Article 2(a), which emphasizes football's unifying, educational, cultural, and humanitarian values. Article 13 operationalizes these values by making them enforceable standards of conduct.

124. Consonant to those principles are the contents of paragraph 2 of article 13, which provides non-exhaustive examples of conduct that may trigger disciplinary measures. These include:

- i. Violations of decent conduct, capturing a wide range of unethical or disrespectful behaviour that undermines the dignity of individuals or the integrity of the sport.
- ii. Insults and offensive gestures, which aim at acts that may erode mutual respect and can incite hostility, contradicting the principles of peace and respect enshrined in Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the FIFA Statutes.
- iii. Non-sporting demonstrations, tackling the use of football events as platforms for political, ideological, or commercial agendas detracts from the neutrality and unity that FIFA seeks to preserve.
- iv. Bringing football or FIFA into disrepute: this provision protects the reputation of the sport and its governing body, ensuring that public trust in the sport of football is not compromised.

125. Each of these examples reflects a threat to the values and credibility of football, and Article 13 empowers FIFA to respond with appropriate disciplinary measures.

126. At the same time, by prohibiting offensive behaviour and safeguarding fair play, Article 13 also supports FIFA's broader commitments to human rights (Article 3 of the FIFA Statutes) and non-discrimination (Article 4 of the FIFA Statutes). Offensive conduct often intersects with discriminatory or abusive behaviour, and the disciplinary framework laid in the FDC ensures that such actions are not tolerated. This reinforces football's role as a safe, inclusive, and respectful space for all participants.

127. Finally, Article 13 FDC contributes to FIFA's objective of promoting friendly relations (Article 5 of the FIFA Statutes). By deterring conduct that could provoke conflict or division, the provisions under article 13 help to maintain a sporting environment conducive to dialogue, cooperation, and mutual respect. This is particularly important in international competitions, where football serves as a bridge between cultures and nations.

128. All in all, the Committee finds that article 13 of the FDC is not merely a list of prohibited behaviours. The provision serves as the normative instrument that translates FIFA's core values, outlined in the FIFA Statutes, into enforceable obligations. It ensures that football remains a sport governed by respect, fairness, and integrity, and that those who participate in it do so in a manner that honours its global mission.

129. In the same manner, the Committee underlined that article 15 of the FDC represents a critical legal instrument in FIFA's regulatory arsenal, designed to combat discrimination and racist abuse within the global football ecosystem. The provision in question can be deemed as both disciplinary in nature and

an operationalization of the normative commitments embedded in the FIFA Statutes, particularly of the cited Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 14 and 15.

130. Article 2 of the FIFA Statutes articulates the organization's overarching objectives, including the promotion of football in light of its unifying, educational, cultural, and humanitarian values. Discriminatory conduct—whether based on race, gender, religion, or other protected characteristics—undermines these values and threatens the integrity of football as a global sport.
131. Moreover, Article 2(e) of the Statutes mandates that football be made available to all, regardless of gender or age. Discrimination, particularly when manifested in abuse or exclusion, directly contravenes this principle. Article 15 FDC thus functions as a safeguard for equal access and participation, reinforcing FIFA's commitment to inclusivity through enforceable legal standards. Along the same lines, FIFA's statutory commitment to respecting internationally recognized human rights, as codified in Article 3 of the Statutes, provides a substantive legal basis for Article 15 FDC. The right to equality and non-discrimination is a cornerstone of international human rights law, enshrined in instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
132. Article 15(1) FDC gives effect to these obligations by prohibiting contemptuous, discriminatory, or derogatory conduct on a wide range of grounds, including race, ethnicity, gender, disability, sexual orientation, and more. The provision's breadth reflects a comprehensive approach to human dignity and aligns FIFA's disciplinary framework with global human rights norms.
133. Further, considering that article 4 of the FIFA Statutes establishes a categorical prohibition on discrimination and provides for sanctions including suspension or expulsion, article 15 FDC complements this provision by detailing specific forms of discriminatory conduct and prescribing minimum sanctions. The legal coherence between Article 4 of the Statutes and Article 15 of the FDC ensures consistency in FIFA's approach to discrimination. It also enhances legal certainty for stakeholders, who are thereby put on notice that discriminatory behavior will be met with predictable and proportionate consequences.
134. Notably, the Committee recalled that article 15(6) introduces a strict liability regime for clubs and associations whose supporters engage in discriminatory conduct. This provision reflects a jurisprudential cornerstone toward institutional accountability, requiring entities to take proactive measures to prevent and address abuse, regardless of fault or negligence. It is a powerful deterrent and a signal of FIFA's commitment to systemic change.
135. Lastly, Article 5 of the FIFA Statutes mandates the promotion of friendly relations among football stakeholders and within society for humanitarian objectives. Discrimination and racist abuse are antithetical to this mandate. They erode trust, provoke conflict, and compromise the social function of football as a bridge between cultures and communities. By enforcing Article 15 FDC, FIFA's statutory objective of protection of individual rights is guaranteed while also upholding the sport's role in fostering peace and social cohesion. The disciplinary measures prescribed under Article 15—ranging from match suspensions to financial penalties—serve both punitive and preventive functions, reinforcing football's capacity to promote harmony and mutual respect.
136. The Committee finds that article 15 of the FDC is a robust provision that embodies FIFA's statutory commitments to equality, human rights, and social responsibility. Its intersection with Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the FIFA Statutes reveals a coherent legal framework aimed at eradicating discrimination and

safeguarding the integrity of football. As discriminatory conduct continues to pose challenges across all levels of the sport, Article 15 FDC stands as a testament to FIFA's resolve to confront such behavior through principled and enforceable legal standards. It can be deemed thus as a declaration of values and a commitment to justice within the global football community.

137. Given the above, the Committee deemed it important to underscore the relevance of article 14 of the FIFA Statutes. This provision in essence codifies the obligations of member associations, establishing a binding framework for compliance, governance, and ethical conduct. As it can be drawn from the above, they are deeply linked with FIFA's disciplinary regime, particularly Articles 13 and 15 of the FDC.

138. Article 14(1)(a) and (d) of the Statutes impose a dual obligation on member associations: to comply with FIFA's Statutes, regulations, and decisions, and to ensure that their own members do the same. This includes adherence to the FDC, which is an integral part of FIFA's regulatory framework. Articles 13 and 15 of the FDC, in particular, serve as the disciplinary instruments through which the ethical principles enshrined in the Statutes—such as fair play (Art. 2), human rights (Art. 3), non-discrimination (Art. 4), and friendly relations (Art. 5)—are enforced.

139. As stated before, article 13 FDC establishes a general obligation for all football stakeholders to respect the Laws of the Game and to act in accordance with the principles of fair play, loyalty, and integrity. This aligns directly with Article 14(1)(h) of the Statutes, which requires member associations to respect the Laws of the Game, and with Article 14(1)(a) and (d), which mandate compliance with FIFA's ethical standards. This includes Member associations are therefore legally responsible for preventing and sanctioning conduct that violates the spirit of the game, including:

- i. Insulting or offensive behavior (Art. 13(2)(b)),
- ii. Non-sporting demonstrations (Art. 13(2)(c)),
- iii. Conduct that brings football into disrepute (Art. 13(2)(d)).

140. These provisions reinforce the obligation of associations to maintain the integrity of the sport and to ensure that football remains a space governed by respect and professionalism. Failure to do so may result in disciplinary action not only against individuals but also against the association itself, particularly where there is a pattern of tolerance or inaction.

141. Accordingly, article 14(2) of the Statutes provides that violations of these obligations may lead to sanctions. When read in conjunction with Articles 13 and 15 FDC, this means that member associations may face disciplinary measures, for instance if they fail to prevent or address offensive or discriminatory conduct, tolerate behavior that undermines fair play or integrity, and neglect their duty to ensure compliance by their members and supporters. It is not by chance that by the same token, art. 15 (b) of the FIFA Statutes require member associations to prohibit all forms of discrimination, which is *pari pasu* with the member association's obligation to enforce said provisions.

142. The intersection of Article 14 of the FIFA Statutes with Articles 13 and 15 of the FDC illustrates a comprehensive and integrated legal framework. Member associations are not only bound to comply with FIFA's rules but are also entrusted with the responsibility of upholding the sport's ethical foundations. Through this framework, FIFA ensures that football remains a global force for fairness, dignity, and inclusion. By internalizing and enforcing these obligations, member associations contribute to the realization of FIFA's mission and protect the integrity of the game at all levels.

143. The Committee therefore draws the conclusion that the obligations of FIFA member associations under Article 14 of the Statutes are grounded in trust, responsibility, and alignment with FIFA's global mission. When read alongside Articles 13 and 15 of the FDC, these obligations demand proactive governance, ethical leadership, and unwavering commitment to the values of football. In fulfilling their duty, member associations embody its principles, ensuring that football remains a force for unity, dignity, and justice across the world.

***In particular: the Respondent's failure to abide by FIFA's statutory objectives***

144. As it will be explained below, the Committee finds that the Respondent has failed to observe its obligations under the FDC and the FIFA Statutes, consisting of a failure to take meaningful and transparent action against discriminatory conduct, its tolerance of politicized and militaristic messaging within football contexts. More broadly, the Respondent has omitted to promote the values of peace, equality, and human dignity, which constitute serious and sustained breaches of Articles 13 and 15 of the FDC, as well as a violation of its fiduciary obligations under Article 14 of the FIFA Statutes.

145. As explained before, article 13(1) of the FDC imposes a general obligation on all football stakeholders, including associations and their officials, to respect the Laws of the Game and to conduct themselves in accordance with the principles of fair play, loyalty, and integrity. The provision is designed to safeguard the ethical foundation of football and to ensure that the sport remains a neutral and unifying force.

146. The conduct of the IFA, in failing to take meaningful action against Beitar Jerusalem FC—a club whose supporters have engaged in persistent and well-documented racist behaviour—constitutes a clear violation of Article 13. The club's use of slogans such as "forever pure," and the repeated chanting of ethnic slurs such as "terrorist" directed at Arab players are not isolated incidents but rather form part of a systemic pattern of conduct that offends the basic rules of decent behaviour and brings the sport into disrepute. The Committee underlined that said club is only a small example of a general failure by the IFA.

147. On this note, the IFA has claimed to have imposed fines totalling ILS 355,500 (approximately CHF 80,000) against Beitar Jerusalem FC and ILS 1,121,750 (approximately CHF 266,000) in general fines against clubs under its jurisdiction. However, the documentation provided fails to specify the matches, incidents, or disciplinary grounds to which these fines relate. There is no indication that the sanctions were imposed specifically in response to racist or discriminatory behaviour, nor is there any evidence of accompanying corrective measures, such as mandatory education, public condemnation, or exclusion of offending supporters.

148. This lack of transparency and specificity renders the sanctions deficient and substantively inadequate. Sanctions must be not only imposed but also proportionate, targeted, and effective in addressing the underlying misconduct, so that the objective of art. 14.1.(d) of the Statutes is met. The fines in question fall short on all three counts.

149. Firstly, the monetary value of the fines is disproportionately low when measured against the gravity and persistence of misconduct. Beitar Jerusalem FC has been widely documented as a club with a deeply entrenched culture of racism. The imposition of relatively minor financial penalties—without further disciplinary action such as stadium bans, point deductions, or suspensions—fails to reflect the seriousness of the violations and sends a message of institutional tolerance rather than deterrence.

150. Secondly, the fines are not demonstrably linked to specific incidents of discriminatory conduct. Without clear attribution, the sanctions lack the deterrent effect necessary to change behavior. They appear to be part of routine disciplinary administration rather than a deliberate and principled response to racism. This undermines the credibility of the IFA's enforcement regime and fails to meet the standards of accountability and transparency required under FIFA's statutory objectives.
151. Thirdly, FIFA's statutory objectives, as articulated in Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the Statutes, require member associations not only to prevent discrimination but to actively promote diversity, inclusion, and peaceful coexistence. The Committee finds that financial penalties, in isolation, do not fulfill this mandate. They do not educate, they do not reconcile, and they do not transform the culture of exclusion that has taken root in certain segments of Israeli football.
152. In continuation, the IFA has made no public statements condemning racism, has not launched any Anti-Discrimination campaigns, and has not taken steps to foster inclusion of Arab or Palestinian players. It has not used its platform to promote peace or to counteract the politicization of football by affiliated clubs and officials. In this context, the Committee finds that the imposition of fines—however nominally punitive—amounts to symbolic compliance rather than substantive engagement with FIFA's statutory values.
153. Moreover, the Committee was of the view that IFA's failure to respond to the public dissemination of political and militaristic messaging by the CEO of the Israeli Professional Football Leagues and by FC Maccabi Netanya further compounds its breach. The social media activity of senior football officials and clubs under the jurisdiction of the Respondent presents a clear and troubling departure from the principles of peace and humanitarian responsibility enshrined in FIFA's Statutes and FDC. These social media messages consisted not a of a mere political opinion by amounted, in the Committee's view, of public communications disseminated through official football channels that carry institutional weight and legal consequences.
154. Particularity as to the LinkedIn post by Mr. Nicolas Lev, CEO of the Israeli Professional Football Leagues, the Committee outlined that it constitutes a non-sporting demonstration. The article, published during an active and highly controversial military campaign in Gaza, explicitly argues against a ceasefire and humanitarian pauses, despite acknowledging the deaths of over 8,000 Palestinians, including many children, and the life-threatening impact of the Israeli blockade. By sharing this article without commentary, qualification, or expression of humanitarian concern, Mr. Lev—acting in his official capacity—used a football-affiliated platform to endorse a political and militaristic narrative. This act undermines the football's core value regarding commitment to promoting peace and friendly relations under Article 5 of the FIFA Statutes. In this respect, the absence of any mitigating language—such as calls for restraint, concern for civilian casualties, or acknowledgment of humanitarian principles—renders the post not only politically charged but ethically problematic. It reflects a failure to uphold the values of fair play, loyalty, and integrity required under Article 13(1) of the FDC.
155. As to FC Maccabi Netanya's social media campaign, which included the dissemination of images of tanks, helicopters, fighter jets, and soldiers alongside the club's emblem and slogans such as "Together we will win!", constitutes a direct politicization of football. The club further invited fans serving in the military to submit photos from the frontlines to be displayed in stadiums and on official social media channels.
156. This campaign transforms football spaces—both physical and digital—into platforms for military glorification, thereby violating the prohibition on non-sporting demonstrations under Article 13(2)(c). It

also contravenes the spirit of Article 5 of the Statutes, which mandates that football be used to promote friendly relations and humanitarian objectives, not to amplify nationalistic or militaristic sentiment. The use of football branding and infrastructure to support military narratives during an ongoing conflict, particularly one involving significant civilian casualties and allegations of human rights violations, is incompatible with FIFA's statutory objectives. It risks alienating communities, exacerbating divisions, and undermining the sport's role as a vehicle for peace and reconciliation.

157. Considering the above, the IFA has not publicly condemned, sanctioned, or distanced itself from these posts. It has not issued any statements reaffirming principles of peace, or humanitarian concern. The Committee finds that this silence is legally significant. Under Article 14 of the FIFA Statutes, member associations are required to ensure that their officials and affiliated entities comply with FIFA's regulations and values. The IFA's failure to act constitutes a breach of its duty, reflecting institutional acquiescence to conduct that violates the FDC and undermines its statutory objectives. To a severe degree, the Committee sees this inaction in the face of misconduct by subordinate entities or officials tantamount to complicity.
158. In summary, the social media posts by Mr. Nicolas Lev and FC Maccabi Netanya, and the IFA's failure to respond, constitute clear violations of Articles 13 and 15 of the FDC, and a breach of the Respondent's fiduciary obligations under Article 14 of the FIFA Statutes. These communications politicize football, glorify military action, and disregard the humanitarian principles that the IFA is mandated to uphold. In the context of an ongoing conflict marked by widespread civilian suffering, the Committee deems that such conduct is in breach of the principles that govern football as stated before.
159. As to the last item on the FARE Report, supported by authoritative findings from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), the Committee finds that it documents a pattern of systemic exclusion of Palestinians from football stadiums and facilities located in Israeli settlements in the West Bank, particularly in areas designated as "Area C." These areas are under full Israeli military and administrative control and are subject to a regime of movement restrictions that disproportionately and discriminatorily affect Palestinians.
160. Irrespective of any findings of the GACC in respect of development of footballing activities by a member association in the territory of another, the movement restrictions imposed on Palestinians in Area C are not merely logistical or incidental. The Committee deemed they are part of a structural system of segregation. Palestinians are required to obtain special permits to enter these areas, which are rarely granted except for labor purposes. The settlements are designated as closed military zones, and football clubs operating within them are structured to serve exclusively Israeli citizens. This results in the exclusion of Palestinians from participation as players, spectators, and youth participants, effectively barring them from the footballing ecosystem in these regions.
161. The Committee deems that such exclusion constitutes direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of national origin and ethnicity. On this note, the exclusion of Palestinians from football infrastructure in Area C directly contravenes several core provisions of the FIFA Statutes:
- Article 2(e) mandates that football be available to and resourced for all who wish to participate, regardless of origin. The current regime denies Palestinians this access.
  - Article 3 commits FIFA to respecting internationally recognized human rights, including the right to freedom of movement, equality, and participation in cultural life.
  - Article 4(1) prohibits discrimination of any kind, including on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, or social origin.

- Article 5 obliges FIFA and its members to promote friendly relations and humanitarian objectives. The exclusionary practices in Area C undermine these goals and foster division and resentment.

162. The IFA, as the governing body responsible for football activities in these territories, bears legal responsibility for the discriminatory effects of these policies. Its failure to challenge, mitigate, or even acknowledge the exclusion of Palestinians amounts to institutional complicity in a system of segregation.

163. For the sake of completeness, the Committee deemed it important in this respect to underline that the IFA has argued that the matter falls outside the jurisdiction of the Committee, citing the ongoing review by the GACC and the unresolved status of the West Bank under international law.

164. FIFA's disciplinary jurisdiction is not contingent on the resolution of geopolitical disputes. The relevant question is whether the IFA, in its capacity as a FIFA member, has permitted or tolerated discriminatory practices within its footballing jurisdiction. The Committee is empowered to adjudicate violations of the FDC and the Statutes, irrespective of the political complexity of the underlying context.

165. Moreover, the IFA's assertion that the allegations are based solely on public international law is incorrect. The allegations are grounded in FIFA's own legal instruments—namely, the FDC and the Statutes—which incorporate human rights principles and prohibit discrimination. The IFA's failure to act in accordance with these instruments constitutes a breach of its obligations, regardless of the status of the territory under international law.

166. Under Article 14 of the FIFA Statutes, member associations are required to prevent and fight against any kind of discrimination and to manage their affairs independently and ethically. The IFA's failure to address the exclusion of Palestinians from football infrastructure, its refusal to acknowledge the discriminatory impact of movement restrictions reflect a breach of fiduciary duty. As stated before, this duty requires member associations to act in good faith, with loyalty to football's mission, and with diligence in the enforcement of its values. The IFA's conduct falls short of these standards and undermines the integrity of football as a global sport committed to inclusion, equality, and peace.

167. The systemic exclusion of Palestinians from football infrastructure in Israeli settlements, and the IFA's failure to address or remediate this exclusion, constitute clear violations of Articles 13 and 15 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code and a breach of the association's fiduciary obligations under Article 14 of the FIFA Statutes.

168. As a final note, the Committee believed the IFA's sustained inaction in the face of the cited circumstances has not only violated specific provisions of the FDC and the FIFA Statutes—it has also brought the sport of football into disrepute, in contravention of Article 13(2)(d) of the FDC.

169. The Committee underline that this provision prohibits conduct that damages the image, reputation, or credibility of football or FIFA. It is designed to protect the integrity of the sport and to ensure that football remains a platform for unity, respect, and ethical conduct. The IFA's failure to uphold these standards has had the opposite effect.

170. This is because the IFA's omission erodes public confidence in the association's commitment to FIFA's values. These omissions have been widely reported and criticized by civil society organizations, media outlets, and international observers, thereby tarnishing the reputation of football in the region and

beyond. As mentioned elsewhere in this decision, the Committee underlies that FIFA's global mission is to promote football as a force for peace, inclusion, and human dignity. When a member association fails to act against discrimination, or allows football platforms to be used for political or militaristic messaging, it undermines this mission and compromises the credibility of FIFA's governance framework. The Committee finds that IFA's conduct has created a perception of impunity and selective enforcement, which is incompatible with the principles of fairness and universality that underpin the sport.

171. In particular, by failing to condemn or remediate discriminatory practices and exclusionary policies—particularly those affecting Palestinians—the IFA has become institutionally complicit in a system that violates the core values of the game. This complicity not only exposes the association to disciplinary liability but also damages the moral authority of football as a tool for social cohesion and intercultural dialogue. The reputational harm is not limited to the IFA. It extends to FIFA itself, insofar as the organization is perceived to tolerate or inadequately address such conduct within its membership. This creates a systemic risk to the legitimacy of FIFA's regulatory and ethical framework, and one which the Committee finds merits a sanction.

### ***Interim conclusion***

172. Based on the above, the Committee decided that the Respondent has committed multiple breaches of its obligations as a FIFA member association. The IFA's conduct, taken as a whole, reflects a systemic failure to uphold FIFA's statutory objectives and a breach of its fiduciary obligations under Article 14 of the Statutes. It has omitted to exercise due diligence and has not demonstrated the ethical leadership required of a FIFA member association. Further, it has failed to demonstrate support for FIFA's values of inclusion, equality, and peace, and has failed to use its platform to promote reconciliation or diversity.

173. In light of the above, the Committee deems that there is a compelling legal basis to proceed with disciplinary measures against the IFA. These measures are necessary not only to address the specific violations identified, but to reaffirm FIFA's commitment to its foundational principles and to ensure that football remains a global force for unity.

174. To conclude, as a result and having determined the foregoing, i.e. that the Respondent was to be held liable for the breaches of article(s) 13 and 15 FDC, the Committee held that the Respondent had to be sanctioned accordingly.

### **3. The determination of the sanction**

175. The Committee observed in the first place that the Respondent was a legal person, and as such was subject to the sanctions described under art. 6.1 and 6.3 FDC, as well as the directives under art. 7, as follows:

#### ***“6. DISCIPLINARY MEASURES***

*1. The following disciplinary measures may be imposed on natural and legal persons:*

- a) warning;*
- b) reprimand;*
- c) fine or any other pecuniary measure;*
- d) return of awards;*
- e) withdrawal of a title;*

*f) order to fulfil a financial obligation arising or existing in the context of a trial.  
(...)*

*3. The following disciplinary measures may be imposed on legal persons only:*

- a) ban on registering new players;*
- b) playing a match without spectators;*
- c) playing a match with a limited number of spectators;*
- d) playing a match on neutral territory;*
- e) ban on playing in a particular stadium;*
- f) annulment of the result of a match;*
- g) deduction of points;*
- h) relegation to a lower division;*
- i) expulsion from a competition in progress or from future competitions;*
- j) forfeit;*
- k) replaying a match;*
- l) implementation of a prevention plan;*
- m) forfeiture of training rewards that are due;*
- n) payment of restitution to an affiliated club;*
- o) payment of a specific amount to a club or a member association.*

## **7. DIRECTIVES**

*1. Directives require those affected by them to behave in a certain manner.*

*2. In addition to disciplinary measures, the FIFA judicial bodies may issue directives stipulating the manner in which a disciplinary measure must be carried out, including the date and conditions on which the disciplinary measure is enforced."*

176. Given the above and with respect to the fines, the Committee recalled that, in accordance with art. 6.4 FDC, in general, it may not be lower than CHF 100, nor greater than CHF 1,000,000.

177. As established above, the Respondent was found liable for breaching articles 13 and 15 FDC in connection with Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 14 and 15 of the Statutes. Given the above, the Committee began by pointing out that art. 13 FDC does not provide for specific sanctions, and that therefore, the different disciplinary measures pronounced under art. 6 FDC could be imposed upon the Respondent in this respect – this, whilst keeping in mind that the sanction(s) thereby imposed must be proportionate to the offence(s) committed and have the appropriate deterrent effect upon the Respondent relative to the sanctionable conduct(s).

178. Furthermore, the Committee underlined that it is responsible to determine the type and extent of the disciplinary measures to be imposed in accordance with the objective and subjective elements of the offence, taking into account both aggravating and mitigating circumstances (art. 25.1 FDC).

179. Having the above in mind, the Committee deems that breaches committed by the IFA strike at the core of what football represents. Football is a global sport built on the principles of inclusion, equality, respect, and peace. It is a platform for unity and dialogue, particularly in regions affected by conflict and division. The IFA's conduct, as documented and analysed above, reflects a severe failure to uphold these principles, and as such, demands a firm and proportionate disciplinary response.

180. The IFA's inaction in the face of entrenched discriminatory conduct and its failure to condemn or distance itself from politicized and militaristic messaging have collectively undermined the ethical foundation of the sport of football. These omissions amount to regulatory breaches as much as a

failure in leadership and governance that have allowed discrimination and division to take root within football structures under the IFA's jurisdiction. Moreover, the exclusion of Palestinians from football infrastructure in Israeli settlements, due to discriminatory movement restrictions and permit regimes, constitutes a *de facto* system of segregation. The IFA's refusal to acknowledge or address this exclusion, and its reliance on jurisdictional arguments to deflect responsibility, further entrenches the perception of institutional complicity in practices that violate FIFA's commitment to human rights and non-discrimination.

181. The Committee deems that the reputational harm caused by these failures is significant. The IFA's conduct has brought football into disrepute, both domestically and internationally, and has damaged public trust in the sport's ability to serve as a force for peace and inclusion. This reputational damage extends to FIFA itself, insofar as it is perceived to tolerate or inadequately address such conduct within its membership.
182. At the same time, the Committee is not oblivious to the complex political and security context in which the IFA operates, which may present challenges in managing football activities in contested or militarized areas. While this context does not excuse discriminatory practices, it may partially explain the operational constraints faced by the IFA. By the same token, the IFA's submission of evidence indicating that some disciplinary fines have been imposed on clubs, including Beitar Jerusalem FC. Although these sanctions are insufficient in the Committee's view, they were taken into account nonetheless in determining the appropriate sanction.
183. Accordingly, these mitigating factors have been duly weighed by the Committee. However, they do not outweigh the severity and systemic nature of the breaches by the IFA. The violations are not the result of isolated misjudgments but of a sustained failure to act in accordance with football's most fundamental values.
184. In light of the above, the Committee concludes that the breaches committed by the IFA are of such gravity and seriousness as to merit severe and exemplary sanctions. These sanctions are necessary not only to hold the IFA accountable but to protect the integrity of football, to reaffirm FIFA's commitment to human rights and non-discrimination, and to restore public confidence in the sport's governance. The Committee further outlined that sanctions in this case are not merely punitive, but also carry corrective, preventive, and symbolic elements insofar as they serve to reinforce the principle that football must never be a platform for exclusion, division, or political exploitation, but must always remain a space for unity, dignity, and peace.
185. The Committee accordingly finds that the following sanctions are in order, since the Respondent's conduct offends the core principles of football: a fine of CHF 150,000 and the implementation of a prevention plan to fight discrimination, per the following directives:
- i. the Respondent is ordered to procure and display in next three (3) A-level FIFA competition matches at home a significant and highly visible banner with the words "Football Unites the World – No to Discrimination". Said banner must be placed in a visible sector of the relevant stadiums, preferably in front of the main TV broadcasting position, and it must be made of high quality and significant size and layout. The size, layout, and positioning of the banner in the stadium shall be submitted by the IFA to FIFA at the latest fifteen (15) days before each match for approval.

- ii. The IFA shall, within sixty (60) days of the notification of the present decision, invest one third (1/3) of fine due towards the implementation of the said plan to ensure action against discrimination and to prevent repeated incidents, in compliance with art. 15 par. 7 of the FDC. The plan shall be approved by FIFA and shall focus on the following areas: reforms, protocols, monitoring, and educational campaigns in stadiums and on official channels for one entire domestic football season.
- iii. The remaining portion of the fine is to be paid within 30 days of notification of the decision.

#### 4. Final determination

186. Before affirming its decision, considering the circumstances surrounding this case, the Committee wishes to express its deep and sincere regret regarding the ongoing humanitarian crisis and armed conflict affecting Palestinians and Israelis. The Committee is acutely aware of the devastating toll that violence, displacement, and instability have taken on civilians, including members of the football community, and it extends its heartfelt empathy to all individuals and families affected—irrespective of nationality, ethnicity, or affiliation.

187. The Committee solemnly acknowledges the horrific terrorist attack of October 2023, which resulted in the tragic loss of hundreds of innocent lives and caused profound trauma and suffering. It equally recognizes the enduring pain of the victims, their families, and the broader communities impacted by this act of violence. At the same time, the Committee also recognizes the immense human suffering and loss of life that has occurred in Gaza and across the region as a result of the ensuing hostilities, including the deaths of thousands of civilians, among them many children.

188. The Committee reaffirms that while its mandate is confined to the application of FIFA's internal regulatory framework, it cannot remain indifferent to the broader human context in which football operates. The sport must remain a platform for peace, dialogue, and mutual respect. Its global reach and unifying power carry with them a responsibility to uphold the values of dignity, equality, and humanity—especially in times of conflict and division.


189. The Committee reiterates its unwavering commitment to these principles and expresses its hope that football can continue to serve as a bridge between communities, a source of hope for youth, and a symbol of solidarity in the face of adversity.

190. In light of all the foregoing, the Committee has determined that the IFA has committed grave and systemic violations of FIFA's core principles. These breaches have undermined the integrity of the sport and brought it into disrepute. As a result, the Committee has imposed a fine of CHF 150,000 and ordered the Respondent to implement a prevention plan in accordance with the directives outlined above.

## Decision

- 1. The Israel Football Association is found responsible for breaching articles 13 and 15 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code (ed. 2025).**
- 2. The following disciplinary measures are imposed on the Israel Football Association:**
  - a. The Israel Football Association is ordered to pay a fine to the amount of CHF 150,000, subject to lit. c) below.**
  - b. The Israel Football Association is issued with a warning regarding its conduct.**
  - c. The Israel Football Association is ordered to implement a prevention plan in accordance with the following directives:**
    - i. The Israel Football Association is ordered to display in its next three (3) A-level FIFA competition matches at home a significant and highly visible banner with the words *"Football Unites the World – No to Discrimination"* alongside the Israel Football Association's logo. The size, layout, and positioning of the banner in the stadium shall be submitted by the Israel Football Association to FIFA at the latest fifteen (15) days before each match for approval.**
    - ii. The Israel Football Association shall, within sixty (60) days of the notification of the present decision, invest one third (1/3) of fine due as per point 2.a. above towards the implementation of a comprehensive plan to ensure action against discrimination and to prevent repeated incidents, in compliance with art. 15 par. 7 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code. The plan shall be approved by FIFA and shall focus on the following areas: reforms, protocols, monitoring, and educational campaigns in stadiums and on official channels for an entire season. The remainder of the fine is to be paid within 30 days of notification of the decision.**

FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE  
DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION



**Jorge Ivan Palacio Palacio (Colombia)**

Deputy Chairperson of the FIFA Disciplinary Committee

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### **LEGAL ACTION:**

This decision can be contested before the FIFA Appeal Committee (art. 60 FDC). Any party intending to appeal must announce its intention to do so in writing, *via* the FIFA Legal Portal, within three (3) days of notification of the grounds of the decision. Reasons for the appeal must then be given in writing, *via* the FIFA Legal Portal, within a further time limit of five (5) days, commencing upon expiry of the first-time limit of three (3) days (art. 60 par. 4 FDC). The appeal fee of CHF 1,000 shall be transferred to the aforementioned bank account upon submission of the appeal brief (art. 60 par. 6 FDC).

### **NOTE RELATING TO THE PAYMENT OF THE FINE:**

Payment can be made either in Swiss francs (CHF) to account no. 0230-325519.70J, UBS AG, Bahnhofstrasse 45, 8098 Zurich, SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A, IBAN: CH85 0023 0230 3255 1970 J or in US dollars (USD) to account no. 0230-325519.71U, UBS AG, Bahnhofstrasse 45, 8098 Zurich, SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A, IBAN: CH95 0023 0230 3255 1971 U, with reference to the abovementioned case number.